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I. INTRODUCTION

The ultimate goal of all judicial proceedings must be the pursuit of the
truth, for without it there can be no justice. Perhaps the greatest affront to justice
is perjury.'
The crime of perjury had its most public hour during the O.J. Simpson
criminal trial when Detective Mark Fuhrman knowingly lied on the witness stand
- as millions watched from the couches of their homes - in the most highly

televised trial in history? Possibly Detective Fuhrman's notorious lying or, as some
cynics lament, a national decline in morals has led some commentators to believe

I

Although the definition of perjury varies slightly from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, a general
definition can be found in BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, which defines it as follows:
In criminal law, the willful assertion as to a matter of fact, opinion, belief, or
knowledge, made by a witness in a judicial proceeding as part of his evidence,
either upon oath or in any form allowed by law to be substituted for an oath,
whether such evidence is given in open court, or in an affidavit, or otherwise, such
assertion being material to the issue or point of inquiry and known to such witness
to be false. A false statement knowingly made in a proceeding in a court of
competent jurisdiction or concerning a matter wherein an affiant is required by law
to be sworn as to some matter material to the issue or point in question.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1139 (6th ed. 1990) (citations omitted). Interestingly, most jurisdictions
emphasize the belief element; that is, a testifying witness must believe his statement, when made, to
be false in order to constitute perjury. Therefore, some courts will convict a declarant for making a
statement that he believes to be false, even though he may have in fact spoken the truth. See Gordon
v. State, 147 N.W. 998 (Wis. 1914); 2 WHARTON, WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW (11th ed. 1912);
Commonwealth v. Miles, 131 S.W. 385 (Ky. 1910). Thus, in a prosecution for giving alcohol to a
Native American (which, in the past, was a crime in Wisconsin), prosecution for perjury was
appropriate where the accused testified that he had not given whisky to a Native American, and the
recipient of the whisky was not a Native American, but she believed the recipient to be a Native
American. Because at the time the statement was made the witness believed the whisky recipient was
a Native American, the accused was guilty of perjury. See Gordon, 147 N.W. at 998. See generally
ROLLIN M. PERKINS & RONALD N. BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAW 518-19 (3d ed. 1982); 2 JOEL P. BISHOP,
BISHOP ON CRIMINAL LAW § 1044 c (John M. Zane & Carl Zollmann eds., 9th ed. 1923).
2

See People v. Simpson, No. BA097211 (Cal. Super. Ct., L.A. County 1995).
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perjury is more prevalent than ever today? On the other hand, some commentators
note that widespread perjury has been with us for ages.4
Even though the existence of perjury can be traced back to antiquity,5

punishment for the crime has not been firmly established until fairly recently.6
Courts attempted to curtail perjury by administering an oath to witnesses. An oath,
it was hoped, would compel a witness to testify truthfully, lest he face the wrath of
a disgruntled supreme deity upon whom the witness had sworn falsely.
Divine intimidation alone was ineffective, as perjury still flourished.'
Hoping to decrease the occurrence of perjury through deterrence,' criminal penalties
for lying under oath were developed? In addition to punishment, legislatures have

See, e.g., Mark Curriden, The Lies Have It, 81 A.B.A. J. 68 (May 1995) ("Judges, lawyers
and experts on the court system worry that perjury is being committed with greater frequency and
impunity than ever before."); Lisa C. Harris, Note, PerjuryDefeatsJustice, 42 WAYNE L. REV. 1755,
,1777 (1996) (stating that the offering of false testimony has become commonplace in the courts).
3

See, e.g., Anthony Salzman, Recantation of Perjured Testimony, 67 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 273 (1976) ("Witnesses have violated their judicially administered oaths to tell the

4

whole truth since the beginning of American jurisprudence.... ."); LUKE OWEN PIKE, HISTORY OF THE
CRIME OF ENGLAND 123 (1883) ("[O]ur ancestors perjured themselves with impunity."). See also Brief
for Appellant at 54, People v. Ezaugi, 141 N.E.2d 580 (N.Y. 1957) ("The tendency to lie even under
oath is substantially the same now as it was three centuries ago.").

5

The crime of common law perjury has existed since at least the Seventeenth Century. See

United States v. Norris, 300 U.S. 564, 574 (1937).
6

See 2 FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH

LAW 242 (2d ed. 1911) ("Very ancient law seems to be not quite certain whether it ought to punish
perjury at all. Will it not be interfering with the business of the gods?"); 3 JAMES F. STEPHEN, HISTORY
OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 242 (1883) ("The real singularity is, that for several centuries, no
trace is to be found of the punishment of witnesses for perjury.").
See Harry Hibschman, "You Do Solemnly Swear!" or That PerjuryProblem, 24 J. AM. INST.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 901, 903 (1934) (arguing that the value of the oath in preventing witnesses
from lying is negligible).
7

8

Id. at 901. However, in our increasingly secular society, an oath's power of encouraging

truthfulness has diminished. IMl As a result, one author has noted the importance of another trial
device better able to elicit the truth: "Cross-examination, - the rarest, the most useful... has always
been deemed the surest test of truth and a better security than the oath." FRANCIS L. WELLMAN, THE
ART OF CROSS-EXAMiNATION vi (4th ed., rev. and enlarged 1936) (quoting Cox).
But see Harris, supra note 3, at 1777 (arguing that current perjury statutes are ineffective and
need to be made harsher, in addition to adding new laws to facilitate swifter and certain prosecutions
for this crime).
9
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developed many other devices, including varying the statutory definition of perjury.
Jurisdictions differ considerably on which, if any, of these devices to follow.
Aside from threatening a witness with penal consequences, there are other
approaches to entice truth telling.10 This Article will discuss exclusively the
recantation doctrine, which is just one of these approaches. Stated simply,
recantation, also known as retraction, is a defense to perjury when a witness
testifies falsely under oath, but later recants his false testimony and offers truth. By
correcting a deliberate misstatement, a liar will be excused from a perjury
prosecution. The policy behind the recantation defense is to encourage truth telling
by barring a punishment for a witness who lied but might wish to purge his
conscience by retracting his false testimony and providing the truth.
Surely laymen - and even some jurists - might consider the recantation
doctrine an uninteresting, obscure area of the law about which to write. Because
of this, it comes as no surprise that the subject of the recantation defense has failed
to spawn much literature on the subject." Yet, this doctrine is of paramount
importance during the few occasions when it is applicable."2 For instance, the
difference between an innocent man being convicted or vindicated is sometimes
determined depending on whether a well-formulated recantation defense exists in

10

See Harris, supra note 3, at 1759-62.

11
note 4.

Perhaps the only article dedicated to the recantation doctrine exclusively is Salzman, supra

12

Admittedly, a witnesses recanting intentionally false testimony is a rarity, but it does occur

on occasion. During such an exceptional occasion the recantation defense plays a pivotal role in
ensuring that a court's justice is based, as much as possible, on truth rather than lies.
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the accused's jurisdiction." The recantation defense plays a pivotal role in allowing
the court to seek out truth and render justice.

On the one hand, some argue the recantation doctrine may actually
contradict its purpose by encouraging a witness to lie. 4 They reason, a witness will
lie, keeping in mind that he can retract his testimony later if he wishes, and avoid
the peril of a perjury conviction. Indeed many of the states feel this way as
evidenced by the recantation defense's minority status in the United States."5 On
the other hand, as this Article will show, a well-formulated recantation defense
increases the likelihood of truth telling and has no danger of encouraging
dishonesty. But a poorly formulated defense, as some courts and commentators

13

One may argue - though not necessarily prevail - that due process is compromised for

litigants when testifying witnesses do not have a well-formulated recantation defense at their disposal
if they lie but later wish to recant. This is even more true in a criminal trial where a defendant's life
and liberty are on the line rather than just money in a civil proceeding. Moreover, the argument goes,
due process demands that the truth come to light at the expense of absolving a liar of his crime of
perjury.
Keep in mind, though, in no way does the lying witness have a constitutional right to a
retraction defense. As this Article later argues, once a lie is made under oath, the liar has committed
a crime, but public policy requires that the crime be excused in order to increase the chance that
truthful testimony will come to light. See infra notes 145-46 and accompanying text. Therefore, as
UnitedStates v. Denison, 663 F.2d 611 (5th Cir. 1981), explained, no right to a recantation defense
exists to the witness, himself. See also Annotation, RecantationAs Bar To PerjuryProsecutionUnder
18 U.S.C.S. § 1623(d), 65 A.L.R. FED. 177, 184-86 (1983). But, as explained above, an argument can
be made that not availing a witness the recantation defense diminishes due process rights of litigants
in both civil and, especially, criminal proceedings.
14

See United States v. Norris, 300 U.S. 564, 574 (1937).

The following are recantation defense statutes that exist in a minority ofjurisdictions: ALA.
CODE § 13A-10-107 (1995); ALASKA STAT. § 11.56.235 (1996); ARK. CODEANN. § 5-53-104 (Michie
1997); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-8-508 (West 1986); DEL. CODEANN. tit. 11, § 1231 (1995); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 837.07 (West 1994); HAW. REV. STAT. § 710-1064 (1993); ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch.
720, para. 5/32-2 (c) (West 1993); IOWA CODE ANN. § 720.2 (West 1993); KY. REv. STAT. ANN. §
523.090 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1990); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 451(3) (West 1983); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 45-7-201(5) (1997); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:28-1(d) (West 1995); N.Y. PENAL LAW §
210.25 (McKinney 1988); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-11-04(3) (1997); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §
4902(d) (1983); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-33-1(d) (1994); TEx. PENAL CODEANN. § 37.05 (West 1994);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.72.060 (West 1988).
The federal government adopted the recantation rule, which it codified in 18 U.S.C. §
1623(d) (1994). Section 1623(d) affords a recantation defense to statements made under oath only
before a grand jury or court. On the other hand, 18 U.S.C. § 1621 (1994), which is applicable more
generally to any statement given under oath, disallows the retraction defense. The disparity between
these two statutes makes it, at times, unclear if a liar may invoke a recantation defense. As such, the
federal retraction defense has drawn criticism from many commentators. See infra note 141.
15
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rightfully fear, will indeed encourage lying. 6 Likewise, a narrowly applied
recantation defense, while not fostering untruthfulness, will lose the possible benefit
of encouraging veracity.
Part II of this Article will discuss the evolution of the recantation defense
in New York, where it was first born in America, and explain New York's current
formulation of the law. The history of the recantation doctrine in New York is
especially noteworthy because its influence on other courts, legislatures, and the
Model Penal Code has been enormous. Moreover, the elements of New York's
recantation defense have been the model for all otherjurisdictions. Although other
jurisdictions do not necessarily use each element in their defenses, those that do
have recantation defenses take all of their elements from New York.
Part III of this Article will look at the completed-crime rule, which is the
rejection of the recantation defense. In addition, this part will examine the rationale
that compels these jurisdictions to vehemently reject the recantation defense and
embrace the completed-crime rule, which at present is the majority standard.
Part IV examines the elements of New York's recantation defense. Of
those elements, this Article discusses which ones various courts and legislatures
throughout the country have embraced and which have been rejected. And in doing
so, this Article examines the reasoning behind the decision to choose some elements
over others.
Part V of this Article begins by denouncing the competed-crime rule's
inflexibility, which hinders the pursuit of truth. Moreover, this part critically
examines the different variations of the recantation defense that exist throughout the
United States. Next, Part V criticizes courts and commentators who advance certain
formulations that have one of two faults: (1) they are ineffective in encouraging
repentance and truthfulness; or (2) as a result of a poor formulation, they actually
promote perjury. Finally, keeping in mind the ultimate function of a judicial
proceeding, this Article proposes an ideal formulation of the recantation defense,
which it is urged, more legislatures and courts should adopt.
II. NEW YORK'S RECANTATION STATUTE
The development and history of New York's recantation defense is an
especially important background for understanding the different variations of the
doctrine nationwide. The defense as we know it today was born in New York, and

See 2 SARA S. BEALE & WILLIAM C. BRYSON, GRAND JURY LAW AND PRACTICE § 11: 10
16
(1986) (noting that "making the recantation defense too broad can have the opposite effect of
encouraging perjury"); Salzman, supra note 4, at 279; Recent Case, Criminal Law - Perjury Correctionof False Testimony, 76 U. PA. L. REV. 751, 752 (1927). See, e.g., United States v. Norris,
300 U.S. 564, 574 (1937).
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all the elements that other states and federal courts include in their recantation
defense are, in part or whole, adopted from New York.
A.

History ofNew York's RecantationDefense

Before the State of New York codified it in 1965,"' recantation was a
common law defense to perjury whose origins can be traced back to ancient AngloSaxon jurisprudence. 8 The first American case to enunciate the doctrine was
People v. Gillette. In Gillette, the defendant, Walter R. Gillette, was accused of
giving misleading statements to a grand jury concerning the ownership of a bank
account." Immediately after making those statements and before leaving the
witness stand, Mr. Gillette told the entire truth concerning the bank accounts. 2'
1.

Testimonial Correction to Show Absence of Willful Perjury

Judge McLaughlin, writing the opinion of the court, believed the actions of
the defendant in Gillette did not constitute perjury in the first place. Judge
McLaughlin noted that the prosecution "had failed to prove that [Mr. Gillette]
committed perjury in testifying as he did. When the defendant's entire testimony
is considered, it seems to me one cannot but be satisfied that [defendant] fully and
frankly testified.. . ." In other words, perjury cannot be ascertained by one's
words or sentences viewed in isolation. A witness's testimony, when considered
in its entirety, must be examined to determine if he "willfully, knowingly, and

17

N.Y. PENAL LAW § 210.25 (McKinney 1988) (effective Sept. 1, 1967, codified 1965).

Is
Cf King v. Jones, I Peake 51, 53 (1791) (citing King v. Carr, 82 Eng. Rep. 1191 (1669)).
But see United States v. Norris, 300 U.S. 564 (1937) (citing Edwards v. M'Leay, 35 Eng. Rep. 316
(1813); Reg. v. Holl, 45 L.T.R. 69 (Q.B.D. 1881)) (arguing that there is doubt that Carr held or
intended to hold that a witness's retraction of his false testimony absolves him of perjury in light of
later English case law).
111 N.Y.S. 133 (N.Y. App. Div. 1908).
20

See id. at 134. Mr. Gillette was subpoenaed to testify before a grand jury in a proceeding

entitled "The People of the State of New York v. John Doe et al." Id.
21

Id.

22

Id. at 138.
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Hence, if a witness corrects his testimony, this is

24
indicative that he did not "willingly" commit perjury.

This premise expressed in Gillette has acted as a stepping-stone doctrine
that leads us to today's recantation defense. Although Judge McLaughlin cited no

authority in Gillette for this principle, he was not the first to conceive of it. In fact,
217 years earlier, Lord Kenyon, in probably the first English-language case on the
subject,' wrote of a similar rule:
The whole of the Defendant's evidence on the former trial should
be proved, for if in one part of his evidence he corrected any
mistake he had made in another part of it, it will not be perjury.
Courts have gone so far as to determine, that where a mistake has

been committed in answer to a bill in Chancery, if the Defendant
set it right in a second answer, it will save him from the perils of
perjury.26
In addition, other English27 and Americanf2 courts have subscribed to this school of
thought before Gillette, and at present it is the prevailing view.29

23

Id. at 139.

24

For the general definition of perjury see supra note 1.

King v. Jones, I Peake's Reports 51 (1791) (citing King v. Carr, 82 Eng. Rep. 1191 (1669)).
The Carrcase, which Jones cited, was written in law French as was the practice in England at that time
period.
25

26

Id at 53.

See, e.g., Reg. v. Holl, 45 L.T.R. 69, 70 (Q.B.D. 1881) ("[a]n indictment for perjury could
not be sustained on an answer afterwards corrected or explained.").
27

See, e.g., Henry v. Hamilton, 7 Blackf. 506, 507 (Ind. 1845) (approving a trial court's
instruction that a witness' corrected statement may be considered to negate the willfulness element
necessary for a perjury conviction).
28

See MODEL PENAL CODE § 241.1cmt. 7, 130-31 (1980) ("Under prevailing law.., a prompt
retraction... [can be used] to bolster the assertion that the original misstatement was inadvertent or
due to a misunderstanding."); Salzman, supra note 4, at 275 ("[C]ourts generally agree that an offer
of testimonial correction is relevant to show that the inaccurate testimony was not deliberately false
and that no perjury was therefore ever committed.").
29
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2.

The Birth of the Recantation Defense

Although convinced that Mr. Gillette's statements were not perjurious (in
light of his entire testimony viewed altogether), Judge McLaughlin, by way of
dictum, assumed, for argument's sake, that Mr. Gillette intentionally testified
falsely.3" He then formulated a two-part test to determine if one who first lies but
later recants his willfully false testimony is barred from perjury prosecution. First,
a witness must have given intentionally false statements while testifying; and,
secondly, "immediately thereafter he fully [and truthfully] explained" his
testimony?
The recantation defense, the court reasoned, is necessary to ensure the most
noble objective of judicial proceedings - rendering justice by eliciting truth.32
Moreover, the court said:
A judicial investigation or trial has for its sole object the
ascertainment of the truth, that justice may be done. It holds out
every inducement to a witness to tell the truth by inflicting severe
penalties upon those who do not. This inducement would be
destroyed if a witness could not correct a false statement except by
running the risk of being indicted and convicted for perjury.33
Therefore, the court held, if one first lies on the witness stand - such as the Gillette
defendant - but later recants his false statement and offers the truth, he should be
absolved of perjury for public policy reasons.3 4 Hence, the recantation defense in
America was born.
Forty-nine years after the Gillette decision, New York's highest court, the
court of appeals, had its first occasion to visit the recantation doctrine in People v.
Ezaugi,35 which has become an important and influential American decision on the
subject. In Ezaugi, a grand jury was investigating Detective Ezaugi and his partner,

30

See People v. Gillette, 111 N.Y.S. 133, 139 (N.Y. App. Div. 1908).

31

Id.

32

See id.

33

Id.

34

See id.

3S

141 N.E.2d 580 (N.Y. 1957).
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both members of the New York City Police Department's Narcotics Squad, to
ascertain whether they conspired with a drug informant to sell narcotics: 6
Prior to the grand jury hearing, however, Detective Ezaugi's informant
complained to the public defender's office that Detective Ezaugi and his partner
were demanding profits from his narcotics sales in return for police protection.3 7
The informant was referred to the Office of the District Attorney's Rackets
Division, which-outfitted him with a concealed recording device to use during his
next meeting with Detective Ezaugi and his partner?8 As expected, Detective
Ezaugi and his partner met with the informant to discuss, among other things, the
payments of money?9 Unknown to the two detectives at the time, the entire
conversation was being recorded for the district attorney.4"
While testifying to the grand jury, Detective Ezaugi denied that the
conversation with the informant took place and, furthermore, he gave other
deliberately false answers and even fabricated a conversation.4! ' After testifying,
Detective Ezaugi had an out-of-court conversation with his partner that convinced
him that the District Attorney knew all along of the true content of his conversation
with the informant.42 Moreover, he knew that his testimony before the grand jury
failed to deceive.43 After pondering the implications of what had transpired,
Detective Ezaugi testified at a subsequent hearing. This time, he admitted he lied
the first time on the witness stand. 44
As a result of the grand jury fiasco, Detective Ezaugi was now named
defendant in a criminal perjury action. Defendant Ezaugi's attorneys then
attempted to invoke the defense of recantation, as articulated in Gillette. In doing

36

See id.at 582.

37

Id.

38

Id.

39

Id. at 582 & n.1.

40

Id. at 582.

41

Id.

42

Id.

43

Id.

44

Id.
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so, they urged the court of appeals not to adopt United States v. Norris,45 which
recently became binding authority to all federal courts, and Defendant's counsel
feared it might be persuasive to some state courts such as New York.!6
In Norris, the United States Supreme Court chose to subscribe to the
complete-crime rule of perjury; 7 that is, where "the telling of a deliberate lie by a
witness completes the crime [of perjury] defined by law."'8 In other words, the
court rejected the recantation doctrine for federal courts.
Ultimately, Ezaugi reaffirmed the recantation doctrine, despite Norris's
unequivocal rejection of it. However, in doing so, Ezaugi also addressed the
reasons that the Supreme Court believed necessitated recantation's abolition - the
concern that witnesses may deceive courts, and if they are caught, recant their lies
to escape punishment. 9 As the Supreme Court observed in Norris,
[h]owever useful that rule [recantation] may be as an aid in
arriving at testimonial truth, it does not follow that it should be
made a rule of universal application, for to do so might just as
surely encourage perjury, especially in those situations where a
witness does not recant until he becomes convinced that his perjury
no longer deceives."

45

300 U.S. 564 (1937).

46

Although a federal decision on perjury recantation is not binding on state courts, Detective

Ezaugi's attorneys feared the Ezaugi court would find Norrispersuasive and, thus, argued vehemently

against New York adopting it:
[E]ven if the Federal Courts limit the dectrine [sic] of recantation as last

enunciated in People v. Gillette []there is no reason for this Court to renounce the
Gillette case .... Even if the Norris rule completely and without exception
discredited the Gillette rule, which it does not, it would not be the first time that
the United States rule of policy was different from the state rule in a particular
instance. A most notable illustration is that in the United States Courts, a
constitutional prohibition against unlawful search and seizure is rigidly observed,
whereas in our Courts we do not have the enforcement of such a prohibition
despite a similar state constitutional provision.
Brief for Appellant at 53-54, People v. Ezaugi, 141 N.E.2d 580 (N.Y. 1957) (citing People v. Defore,
150 N.E. 585 (N.Y. 1926), cert. denied, 270 U.S. 657 (1926)).
47

See infra note 65 and accompanying text.

48

Norris,300 U.S. at 576 (emphasis added).

49

See id. at 574.

so

Ezaugi, 141 N.E.2d at 583.
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Clearly, the Ezaugi defendant recanted his false testimony only after being
convinced that his perjury was no longer believable. Realizing this, the court of
appeals considered Detective Ezaugi's recantation "not a demonstration of
penitence to purge the torments of a guilty conscience, but a calculated effort to
escape the dire consequences of admitted false swearing."'"
Taking these concerns into consideration, the Ezaugi court then limited the
application of the recantation doctrine to the following circumstances: (1) when a
perjurer corrects knowingly false testimony; (2) if it is done "promptly"; (3) if it is
done "before the body conducting the inquiry"; (4) if it is done before the inquiry
has been deceived or misled to the detriment of its investigation; (5) and, finally,
if no reasonable likelihood exists that the perjurer has learned his untruths have
been or will be discovered. 2
The fourth and fifth elements were entirely new to New York (the fifth was
identical to a concern expressed in Norris) and caused one dissenting justice to fear
the demise of the defense's utility in light of the majority's decision 3 All other
elements the Ezaugi court listed were inherited from Gillette.
B.

The CurrentRecantationLaw in New York

In 1965, the New York legislature codified the recantation doctrine based
on the Ezaugi decision in section 210:25 of the New York Penal Law. 4 In doing
so, the legislature made it an affirmative defense and adopted substantially the
language of the Model Penal Code's retraction statute.55 Unlike New York's
common law recantation defense, New York Penal Law Section 210.25 called the
defense "retraction," rather than "recantation," and required that a witness retract
his false statement "in the course of the proceeding in which it was made," rather
than "promptly," as was held in Ezaugi.6
51

Id.

52

See id.

Id. at 583 (Desmond, J., dissenting) (stating that the new elements, "while appearing to
reaffirm the ancient and sound recantation rule, (citation omitted) actually so limits and hedges that
rule as to leave it without any utility").
53

See New York State Commission on Revision of the Penal Law and Criminal Code,
PROPOSED NEW YORK PENAL LAW, COMIvSSION STAFF NOTES 135 (1964).
54

MODEL PENAL CODE § 241.1(4) (1967). See infra note 116 and accompanying text for the
full text of this statute.
5s

56

See Ezaugi, 141 N.E.2d at 583.
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The codified retraction defense, which to present has never been amended,
reads as follows:
In any prosecution for perjury, it is an affirmative defense that the
defendant retracted his false statement in the course of the
proceeding in which it was made before such false statement
substantially affected the proceeding and before it became manifest
that its falsity was or would be exposed. 7
1.

New York Penal Law Section 215.25 is Unclear

Probably the most ambiguous part of the statute is the term "in the course
of the proceeding." Does this mean during the course of an entire criminal trial?
That is, from grand jury to sentencing hearing, or just during the grand jury
hearing?58 Or in a civil trial, from discovery until all post-trial appeals have been
exhausted?
Unfortunately, New York lawmakers left no legislative history - and the
courts have generated little precedent - to explain the duration of the locus
poenitentiae,9 which, in the context of a recantation rule, refers to the time period
in which one may correct his misstatement in order to be pardoned from a perjury
prosecution. To complicate matters, the little precedent that exists is pre-1967
(before the statute was codified and enacted); thus, it interprets the common law
recantation defense, which uses the word "promptly," from Ezaugi, rather than "in
the course of the proceeding." Lastly, though the statue has been in effect and good
law for over thirty years, no court has rendered a published decision commenting
on the duration of the locuspoenitentiaein reference to the codification's language.
Needless to say, it is unclear how applicable the pre-1967 recantation case
law is to today's statute. Keeping this in mind, this Article will now examine the
few New York decisions that define the locuspoenitentiae.
Early in the century, one court held the recantation defense to be viable
when one corrects false testimony "before the submission of the case. ' Oddly

37

See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 210.25 (McKinney 1988).

The retraction statute is equally applicable to civil trials, but it may have stronger due process
implications for criminal trials. See supra note 13.

58

59

For a more detailed discussion of locus poenitentiae, see infra notes 96-116 and

accompanying text.
60

People v. Brill, 165 N.Y.S. 65, 71 (N.Y. Ct. of Gen. Sessions, N.Y. County 1917) (citing

People v. Gillette, 111 N.Y.S. 133 (N.Y. App. Div. 1908)).
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enough, the same court later barred the recantation defense for one who recanted
a four-month-old misstatement before the termination of the proceeding.' The most
recent case, decided in 1959 (which is the only one to comment on the precodification Ezaugi standard), said a correction of testimony over two weeks after
a witness first lied to a grand jury did not automatically preclude the use of the
recantation defense."
From a plain reading of the statute, "in the course of the same proceeding"
- if not constituting the entire proceeding - is at least a longer period of time than
"done promptly." The few commentators that discuss this distinction concur:
In place, however, of the Ezaugi requirement that the retraction be
"done promptly," §210.25 provides a defense if the retraction is
made "in the course of the proceeding." If there is a temporal
difference between the making of the false statement and a
retraction thereof by the defendant, §210.25 recognizes that the
purposes of justice are equally well served if the retraction is
something less than "promptly" made, provided however, that
when the false statement is retracted, it has not substantially
affected the proceeding and has not been or was not then likely to
be exposed.63
As mentioned previously, to date no New York court has discussed this
distinction in the context of New York's retraction statute. But a few other
jurisdictions have either by statute or case law defined "procedure" within the
context of their recantation defense.' Perhaps one of these cases might be
persuasive to a New York court pondering this distinction.

61

See People v. Markan, 206 N.Y.S. 197, 199 (N.Y. Ct of Gen. Sessions, N.Y. County 1924).

See People v. Ashby, 195 N.Y.S.2d 301,304 (N.Y. App. Div. 1959), rev'd on othergrounds,
168 N.E.2d 672 (N.Y. 1960).

62

N.Y.

LAW § 210.25, Arnold D. Hechtman, Practice Commentaries, 488, 489-90
(McKinney 1975); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 210.25, Richard G. Denzer & Peter McQuillan, Practice
63

PENAL

Commentary, 710, 712 (McKinney 1967). The preceding commentaries, by different authors writing
on the same statute, are identical. Interestingly, the subsequent McKinney commentary included in
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 210.25, William C. Donnino, Practice Commentaries, 515, 521 (McKinney 1988),
makes no mention of this distinction. Perhaps the last author, Mr. Donnino, because of a lack of
controlling authority, disbelieves the distinction asserted by his predecessors to the McKinney
commentaries.
64

See infra notes 104-07 and accompanying text.
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Ambiguity still remains, however, and liars deciding whether to correct a
lie have no clear-cut answer to whether their locus poenitentiaehas expired.
III. THE COMPLETED-CRIME RULE:
THE REJECTION OF THE RECANTATION DEFENSE

Jurisdictions that reject the recantation defense consider the act of making
willful and knowingly false statements to be criminally culpable behavior.
"Deliberate material falsification under oath constitutes the crime of perjury, and
the crime is complete when a witness's statement has once been made," said the
Supreme Court in UnitedStates v. Norris."'
The key element to completing the crime of perjury is willfulness. Thus,
a witness whose conscience compels him to subsequently correct lies he has offered
while under oath is still a perjurer who deserves punishment, according to the
complete-crime rule. In fact, as the Norris court said, a witness's first willful
misstatement is considered culpable conduct from the instant it was uttered;
therefore, he cannot escape the penal consequences by invoking a defense 6
The Norris Court, an ardent supporter of the completed-crime rule,
expressed its distaste for the recantation defense:
[The recantation defense] ignores the fact that the oath
administered to the witness calls on him freely to disclose the truth
in the first instance and not to put the court and the parties to the
disadvantage, hindrance, and delay of ultimately extracting the
truth by cross examination, by extraneous investigation[,] or other
collateral means.67
Proponents of the completed-crime rule, such as the Norris Court, feel its deterrent
value most effectively optimizes truthfulness of initial statements by deterring

65

300 U.S. 564, 574 (1937).

See id. Keep in mind, the key elements for perjury culpability are that the false statement
was known to be false and made willfully. Without these elements, perjury cannot be predicated. But,
also remember, a witness threatened with perjury can argue that a subsequent statement to correct or
clarify previous testimony is indicative that one did not willfully and knowingly lie from the start. In
such an instance, a crime has not been committed. See supra notes 1, 22-29 and accompanying text.
66

67

Norris,300 U.S. at 574.
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fabrication in the first place,6 8 in addition to punishing liars for culpable behavior
regardless of their subsequent corrections, if any. In other words, retributive theory

favors punishment for an offered lie, regardless of any retraction made by the liar.69
The completed-crime rule became known as the federal rule on recantation,
as a result of the Supreme Court's adoption of it in Norris." Ironically, use of this
term today would be an anachronism since Congress substantially rejected the

completed-crime rule in the perjury section of its Organized Crime Control Act in
1970."' Despite Congress's adoption of the recantation rule, the majority of states
still adhere to the completed-crime rule. In fact, one completed-crime jurisdiction
expressly rejects the recantation rule by statute.72
IV. A SURVEY OF THE RECANTATION DOCTRINE NATIONWIDE
All recantation defenses in the United States, whether they be court made
or statutory,' derive their basic elements from the defense as set forth in Ezaugi and
later codified by New York's legislature (which adopted substantially the language
of the Model Penal Code74). Although other jurisdictions' elements are borrowed
from New York, not all recantation defenses are the same. For instance, some states
use only a portion of New York's elements, while others use them all; hence, they
follow what has been known as the "New York rule."75 Of those elements that are

68

See id. at 574. See also Loubriel v. United States, 9 F.2d 807 (2d Cir. 1926); Martin v.

Miller, 4 Mo. 39 (1835).
69

See Norris, 300 U.S. at 574.

70

See W.M. Moldoff, Annotation, Recantationas Defense in PerjuryProsecution,64 A.L.R.2D

276, at 278 (1959).
See 18 U.S.C. § 1623 (1994).
72

See Wis. STAT. § 946.31 (1996).
Today, almost all recantation defenses are statutory.

The American Law Institute codified the Ezaugi decision in MODEL PENAL CODE § 241.1(4)
(1967), changing the language slightly, which, in turn, New York's legislature adopted in its
codification of the recantation defense in N.Y. PENAL LAW § 210.25 (McKinney 1988). Since then,
most states with recantation defenses have adopted the Ezaugi decision, as enunciated in the Model
Penal Code's language.
74

See Norris v. United States, 86 F.2d 379 (8th Cir. 1936), rev'd, 300 U.S. 564 (1937);
Salzman, supra note 4, at 280; W. M. Moldoff, Annotation, Recantation as Defense in Perjury
Prosecution,64 A.L.R.2D 276, at 278 (1959).
75
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borrowed, some jurisdictions use differing language. Such language variations may
be only subtle, yet they have an impact on the defense's application. But all
jurisdictions that subscribe to the defense are the same in that all the elements used,
in part or whole, come from New York. In other words, states have not created new
elements that are unique to their jurisdiction.
There are three basic elements, which include (A) motive or mens rea,(B)
locus poenitentiae,and (C) effect on party and/or proceeding.
A.

Motive or Mens Rea Element

Motive is the "cause or reason that moves the will and induces action." 76
The first recantation defense, formulated by People v. Gillette," made no mention
of a motive requirement for the recanter. Other subsequent decisions, however,
heavily criticize the Gillette court's failure to mention the motive element; they
insist that without one, the incentive to perjure oneself would actually increase.7"
Today, most jurisdictions and the Model Penal Code have expanded on
Gillette and now look to the liar's mens rea to determine if he deserves a defense.
Keep in mind, however, that motive, in the context of this Article, does not refer to
the reason the witness originally lied on the stand. Rather, in the context of the
recantation doctrine, motive refers to the liar's reasons for recanting his
misstatements. In particular, a court would look to see if a recanter's motivation for
correcting his lies is to avoid prosecution by authorities who are aware or will
become aware of the lies. Although this goal is universal to most recantation-rule
jurisdictions, the language jurisdictions employ to achieve this goal is sometimes
different. Additionally, some jurisdictions - like the Gillette opinion - still
disregard motive entirely. Below this Article will discuss the different language
jurisdictions use to determine whether the liar's motive for recanting entitles one
the shelter of a recantation defense. In addition, the Article shall look at recantation
76

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1014 (6th ed. 1990).

77

111 N.Y.S. 133 (N.Y. App. Div. 1908).

See United States v. Norris, 300 U.S. 564, 575 (1937) (criticizing Gillette's precedential
value because it was not rendered by the court of appeals, New York's highest court, and because a
subsequent case, People v. Markan, 206 N.Y.S. 197 (N.Y. Ct. of Gen. Sessions, N.Y. County 1924),
refused to follow Gillette where a contradictory statement was not part of the same examination at
which the first statement was uttered); People v. Ezaugi, 141 N.E.2d 580, 582-83 (N.Y. 1957)
(implying that the recantation defense should not be universally applied in situations where the liar has
a tainted motive for recanting).
78

79

See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-8-508 (West 1986); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:28-1 (d)

(West 1995).
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statutes that disregard motive altogether and how motive, or a lack thereof, affects
application of the recantation defense.
1.

Objective-View-of-Motive Standard

Most recantation defense language requires a false statement to be corrected
"before it became manifest that the falsification [of one's prior statement] was or
would be exposed."80
This type of language, semantically, does not look exclusively at a "pure
motive" - that is, the subjective reason the liar recants. The language aims to
preclude the recantation defense to a witness who fears he will soon be caught and
hopes to escape punishment by recanting, because the authorities have discovered
or will discover his untruths.
The term "objective-view-of-motive" standard is more accurate because a
sensible interpretation of the language "it becomes manifest" does not require
courts to look only to the liar's mens rea. If the authorities merely have discovered
the lie or will discover the lie in the future, then the defense is barred. Admittedly,
however, few courts have discussed this distinction. In fact, some courts in
interpreting "it becomes manifest" have flatly stated the opposite; that is, that this
language looks only to the subjective mens rea of the liar.8 ' Thus, this language, as
so

MODEL PENAL CODE § 241.1 (4) (1997). See also the following state recantation statutes,

which use the same or similar language: ALA. CODE § 12A-10-107 (1995); DEL. CODE ANN. tit 11,
§ 1231 (1996); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 837.07 (West 1994); HAW. REV. STAT. § 710-1064 (1993); ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 720, para. 5/32-2 (c) (West 1993); KY. REV. STAT. ANN § 523.090
(Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1990); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 451 (3) (West 1983); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 45-7-201(5) (1997); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-11-04 (3) (1997); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:28-1 (d)
(West 1995); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 210.25 (McKinney 1988); OR. REV. STAT. § 162.105 (1995); 18 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4902 (d) (West 1983); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-33-1 (d) (1994); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 9A.72.060 (West 1988).
81

See United States v. Clavey, 578 F.2d 1219, 1222 n.5 (7th Cir. 1978); State v. Hanson, 302

N.W.2d 399 (N.D. 1981). Both the Clavey and Hanson cases hold that their recantation statutes are
based on N.Y. PENAL LAW § 210.25 (McKinney 1988), which is based on the rule enunciated in
People v. Ezaugi, 141 N.E.2d 580 (N.Y. 1957). One part of the original Ezaugi rule, the Hanson court
pointed out, is that a successful retraction defense is viable "when no reasonable likelihood exists that
the witness has learnedthat his perjury is known or may become known to the authorities." Hanson,
302 N.W.2d at 403 (quoting Ezaugi, 141 N.E.2d at 583) (emphasis added). This, essentially, is the
good-faith standard, which is discussed later. See infra 87-88 and accompanying text. Thus, the
Hanson court believes
that the exposure of the perjury becomes "manifest" when the defendant knows
or has reason to know that the authorities are or will be aware of the falsification
.... it may be important to know whether or not the authorities have already
discovered, or are certain to discover, the falsification when we are assessing the
defendant's state of mind, but that alone does not determine the validity of the
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interpreted by these courts, is really a good-faith motive, which is discussed in the

following section.82

Despite these interpretations, this Article contends that a plain reading of
the language instructs courts to look to the outside circumstances that exist at the
time of a liar's recantation to determine if he had the proper motivation to recant namely, whether authorities have discovered or will discover the lies before the liar
recants.83 Thus, it is possible for a lying witness who is convinced of the secrecy
of his misstatements to repent and offer a retraction and still face a perjury

conviction. For instance, if, unknown to a now-recanting witness, authorities learn
through other means (or it is manifest that they will subsequently learn through
other means) that the witness lied when first testifying, the witness's recantation
defense is divested and he will face a perjury conviction. In order to fulfill this
element's language, the recantation must have been done "before it became
4
manifest that the falsity of one's prior statement was or would be exposed." This
means manifest to the authorities, or, presumably, the liar, himself, believes it has

become manifest to the authorities.85 Therefore, if the authorities discover the lie,

retraction defense. It is not the state of mind of the authorities that controls.
Hanson, 302 N.W.2d at 403.
The federal judiciary shares similar sentiments and interprets this language as applying to
the witness, himself. See, e.g., United States v. Denison, 663 F.2d 611 (5th Cir 1981); United States
v. Serimgeour, 636 F.2d 1019 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Tucker, 495 F. Supp. 607 (E.D.N.Y.
1980); United States v. Swainson, 548 F.2d 657 (6th Cir. 1977); United States v. Mazzei, 400 F. Supp.
17 (W.D. Pa. 1975). See generally Annotation, 65 A.L.R. FED. 177, 191-95 (1983).
82

See infra notes 87-88 and accompanying text where this Article discusses the good-faith

motive.
This Article later advocates this type of motive standard for an ideal recantation defense. See
infra notes 138-53 and accompanying text.
83

The element would also be fulfilled if at the time of the trial for perjury it comes to light that
the lying subsequently came to the attention of the authorities.
84

Again, wepresume that this language applies to the liar's subjective belief that the authorities
have or will discover his lies. There is little, if any, case law to contradict this hypothesis. Assuming,.
however, this language is inapplicable to the liar's mens rea, there would be a different outcome under
the following hypothetical: A witness, who happens to be nervous and perhaps a bit paranoid,
convincingly lies on the witness stand. The witness subjectively believes the authorities have or will
discover his falsehoods, but in reality there is no prospect of the disclosure. Because of this fear, he
says to the court, "I know the prosecution learned my testimony was intentionally false; therefore, I
would like to retract it now and replace it with the truth," which he does. If we interpret the language
as not applying to the liar's beliefs, the witness will have successfully fulfilled the objective-view-ofmotive element under this interpretation of the language, and he would be protected from perjury
prosecution. (Only if the authorities have or will possibly catch the lie can the witness be prosecuted.)
85
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it is irrelevant what the recanter believes. In summary, under the objective-view-ofmotive standard, if either the authorities discover the lie, or the liar subjectively
believes the authorities have discovered or will discover the lie (even if the
authorities had not and will not discover the lie), 6 the recantation defense is
unavailable under the objective-view-of-motive.
2.

Good-Faith Motive Standard

Jurisdictions that follow a good-faith standard provide that "a recantation
must take place before the discovery of the falsification became known to the
witness, himself."' 7 Though the policy goal for this type of language is identical to
that of the objective-view-of-motive language discussed previously, 8 the outcome
of its application is not always the same. With this purely subjective language, it
is irrelevant whether the authorities ever learn of the lie. To invoke the defense, it
only matters that the liar himself has no knowledge that the authorities have or will
have learned of his lie before he retracts it. Thus, as long as a witness believes his
untruths are secret, he may invoke the defense. Needless to say, once the authorities
have made public their knowledge of the lies or commenced a perjury prosecution
against the liar, the discovery of the lie is known to the liar and the defense is
divested.
This good-faith motive is better understood by contrasting it with the
objective-view-of-motive standard in a hypothetical: A witness testifies falsely, but
later decides to clear his conscience by offering the truth to the court. Unknown to
the witness and before his recantation, the district attorney obtains documents that
incontrovertibly prove the witness willfully lied while testifying. Using an
objective-view-of-motive, the witness must be convicted of perjury because it
became manifest that the falsification was or would be exposed. For an objectiveview-of-motive standard, the liar's beliefs are usually irrelevant.
However, with a defense that requires a goodfaith motive, this element is
satisfied because the witness subjectively believes his false statements were secret

It would be irrelevant that his mens rea is guilty, in that he believes he will soon be caught.
86

See supra note 85.

The language quoted above is fictitious; no statute uses precisely the same language, but the
following statutes have similar language: ALASKA STAT. § 11.56.235(b)(1) (1996); HAw. REv. STAT.
§ 710-1064(l)(a) (1993). In addition, OR. REV. STAT. § 162.05(a) (1997) has similar motive language,
which provides a retraction to be made "in a manner showing complete and voluntary retraction of the
prior false statement." Id.
87

88

See supra notes 80-85 and accompanying text.
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at the time of recantation. Therefore, under a good-faith motive requirement, the
witness's retraction excuses his former perjury.
3.

Motive Irrelevant

A small number of jurisdictions have no motive requirement for their
recantation defenses.89 For these jurisdictions, it is important only that the
statement was retracted - the reason why is purely irrelevant. As long as a liar
recants, he may still invoke the defense so long as all other requisite elements of the
defense are satisfied.
Jurisdictions with this type of defense are few in number and have elicited
criticism from courts and commentators alike," even some among those who are
ardent supporters of the recantation doctrine dislike a no-motive recantation
defense.9 1 Clearly, those who subscribe to the complete-crime rule believe that
disregarding the motive of a recanter perverts justice by encouraging perjury.92
Nonetheless, the motive-irrelevant standard does have its advocates who
reason as Judge Desmond does below:
[S]ince the recantation rule's purpose is not to reward or punish the
liar but to get the truth into the record, the perjurer's motive for

recanting has nothing to do with it at all.

COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-8-508 (West 1986); ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 720, para. 5/322 (c) (West 1993); IOWA CODE ANN. § 720.2 (West 1993). See also People v. Ezaugi, 141 N.E.2d 580,
584 (N.Y. 1957) (Desmond, J., dissenting) (arguing that motive element should not be considered for
deciding the availability of the recantation defense); Commonwealth v. Irvine, 14 Pa. D. & C. 275
(1930). Today, the Irvine court's adoption of the no-motive standard is not followed because
Pennsylvania's retraction statute, 18 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 4902(d) (1983), specifically provides for
a motive requirement.
89

90

See Ezaugi, 141 N.E.2d at 582-83. In addition, this Article is critical of the no-motive

standard.
91

See id. at 583; Salzman, supra note 4, at 280.

UnitedStatesv. Norris,300 U.S. 564, 574 (1937); Recent Case, CriminalLaw -Perjury Retraction of False Testimony Held No Bar to Prosecution,51 HARv. L. REv. 165 (1937) ("Since,
however, a perjurer will not usually retract unless his falsehood has been demonstrated, retractions
thus induced will be of little value in furthering the administration ofjustice.").
92

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1997

21

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 100, Iss. 2 [1997], Art. 6
WEST VIRGINIL4 LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 100:353

The high public purposes and policy behind the recantation
rule should constrain us to uphold and implement it, not destroy it
by limitations [such as a motive].'
Even the American Law Institute, which advocates a motive standard in its Model
Penal Code,94 concedes that there is "some possibility that the defense may be
unfairly denied if the courts apply too rigidly the requirement that recantation
precede exposure of the falsehood."'95 Nevertheless, the no-motive standard is still
regarded as unsound and followed by very few jurisdictions.
B.

Locus Poenitentiae or Time Period

9 6 Latin for "opportunity to repent," refers to the time
Locus poenitentiae,
period in which one may recant false testimony and avoid a perjury prosecution.
Like all other recantation defense elements, a subtle difference in language affects
the defense's application significantly. The Ezaugi court first required a liar to
recant his statement "promptly" before it became manifest that the falsity was or
would be exposed and before the proceeding was prejudiced.97 Following the
Model Penal Code's lead,98 New York codified Ezaugi using the language "in the
course of the proceeding in which it was made," 9' instead of "promptly."' ' The
vast majority ofjurisdictions use language that is largely synonymous to the Model
Penal Code. A smaller number of courts use language that is similar, but more

93

Ezaugi, 141 N.E.2d at 584 (Desmond, J., dissenting).

See MODEL PENAL CODE § 241 (4) (1962). This code section provides that a retraction must
be made "before it became manifest that the falsification was or would be exposed." Id.
94

95

MODEL PENAL CODE

§ 241 cmt. 7 (1980).

Justice Roberts in United States v. Norris, 300 U.S. 564, 572 (1937), uses this term to
describe the time period in which one has to recant his false statement.
96

97

Ezaugi, 141 N.E.2d at 580.

98

MODEL PENAL CODE

§ 240.1 (4) (1962). See infra note 116 and accompanying text for the

full text.
99

N.Y. PENAL LAW § 210.25 (McKinney 1988).

100

Ezaugi, 141 N.E.2d at 583.
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defined, such as during the "same continuous trial,"'' "before completion of the
testimony at the official proceeding,"'0 2 and before the case is "submitted to the
ultimate trier of fact."' 0 3
But for the Model Penal Code, and other statutes like it, what does
"proceeding" mean? As mentioned earlier, for over thirty years that New York
Penal Law section 210.25 has been on the books, New York's judiciary has never
commented on its recantation defense statute.'" Other jurisdictions have at least
received interpretations from their judiciaries: "Without question," a New Jersey
court said, "the term 'proceeding,' standing alone, is broad enough to cover each
step or all steps in a criminal action from commencement to final legislation."'0 "
Other courts have given the term "proceeding" a narrower reading than
New Jersey. 6 In addition, some state lawmakers have, themselves, expressly
defined what "proceeding" means by statute." 7
The definition of such words is of paramount importance. For example, if
"proceeding" is construed narrowly, it could mean before the testifying witness
leaves the stand. In this instance, one who recants after leaving the stand may not
have caused harm to the parties or proceeding, and he may have even retracted
before it became manifest that his falsity has or would be discovered; yet because
his retraction was after the mandated locuspoenitentiae(which in this instance is
the same "proceeding," interpreted to mean before he leaves the witness stand), his

0I1

ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch.

720, para. 5/32-2 (c) (West 1993). See also FLA. STAT. ANN. §

837.07 (West 1996) (using the language "in the same continuous proceeding or matter").
102

TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 37.05 (West 1995).

103

OR. REV. STAT. § 162.105(c)

I04

See supra notes 59-64 and accompanying text.

10s

State in the Interest of J.S., 642 A.2d 430 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1994).

(1997).

See People v. Valdez, 568 P.2d 71 (Colo. 1977). Although Colorado's statute codifying the
recantation defense already had defined the word "proceeding" by statute, the Valdez court further
defined it as including various stages of a trial, but not a mistrial. Id.
106

ARK. CoDE ANN. § 5-53-104 (Michie 1995) provides: "Statements made in separate hearings
107
at separate stages of any official proceeding shall be deemed to have been made in the course of the
same proceeding." But this is limited by Brown v. State, 707 S.W.2d 313 (1986), which held in the
context of Arkansas' recantation statute, that a hearing plea withdrawal and the hearing on the accepted
guilty pleas were not part of the same "proceeding" when the previous phase ended. COLo. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 18-8-508 (West 1986) in part, provides: "Statements made in separate hearings at separate

stages of the same trial or administrative proceeding shall be deemed to have been made in the course
of the same proceeding." Id.
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recantation defense will fail. By contrast, jurisdictions that interpret "proceeding"
broadly, might award a recantation under these circumstances.
Another important distinction is that jurisdictions employ one of the three
different forms of locus poenitentiae. Some use a fixed or independent time period
to determine whether a liar deserves a pardon. Others make the locuspoenitentiae
contingent upon the motive and/or prejudice to a party or proceeding. Lastly, most
jurisdictions use a combination of both of these two.
In the absence of accepted terminology to describe these variations, this
Article takes the liberty of coining terms for them: (1) "fixed locus poenitentiae,"
(2) "contingent locus poenitentiae," and (3) "hybrid locus poenitentiae"
respectively. Each variation is discussed in turn.

1.

Fixed Locus Poenitentiae

A small number ofjurisdictions require a liar to recant before a finite period
of time, which is defined by the language comprising the defense.l"' Unlike the
other locuspoenitentiaevariations, this time period is not contingent upon any other
events. An example of such language can be found in Colorado's retraction statute:
"No person shall be convicted of perjury in the first degree if he retracted his false
statement in the course of the same proceeding in which it was made."'0 9 Note that
the only time-period requirement is that a witness retract his falsehood "in the
' 10
course of the same proceeding in which it was made."
2.

Contingent Locus Poenitentiae

After a careful reading of the language of some recantation statutes, it
becomes apparent that the locus poenitentiae is not always a finite period of time
that is the same under all circumstances. Instead, most recantation defenses have
variable time periods that are contingent upon another factor or factors."' For

108

Although there may be language defining the period of time, it is often not clear what that

language means, unless there is adequate case law to explain it further.
109

COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 18-8-508 (West 1990).

110

Id. Although Colorado defines "procedure" within the context of its retraction defense, many

other states have not developed a specific definition.
Il
Although most the locus poenitentiaefor most defenses have an event upon which it is
contingent, the vast majority are hybrid locuspoenitentiae. In other words, they require that one recant
before a contingent event (e.g., before the parties and procedure are prejudiced), in addition to having
to follow a finite period of time (e.g., before the conclusion of the proceeding).
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instance, usually one may recant before the parties or proceeding are prejudiced,
and some defenses require a lie to be retracted before it becomes manifest that the
falsity of their testimony has or will be known."' Additionally, some jurisdictions
require a full recantation before both of these. The following recantation statute is
an example of a contingent locus poenitentiae:
§ X Recantation - Defense to Perjury
It is a defense to perjury that a witness recant a knowingly false
statement before it becomes manifest that the falsity has been or
will be discovered or the lie has substantially prejudiced any party
or the proceeding."
Accordingly, for a recanter to successfully invoke a section X defense, he must
recant before the lie has been or will be exposed or a party or the proceeding has
been prejudiced.
Few courts, if any, have discussed the advantages or disadvantages of one
locus poenitentiae over another. One commentator, however, has considered the
distinction and, though not using this Article's terminology, expresses his fondness
for the contingent locus poenitentiae,while criticizing a fixed time period:
[T]he immediacy with which testimony must be corrected in order
for the perjury to be excused should be construed to require
measurement not by an inflexible rule which perfunctorily rejects
any correction made after an arbitrarily determined period of time.
Instead, immediacy should be determined primarily by the measure

112

The following are some defenses that require one to recant before one or both of these

contingencies: ALA. CODE § 12A-10-107 (1995); DEL. CODE ANN. tit 11, § 1231 (1995); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 837.07 (West 1994); HAW. REV. STAT. § 710-1064 (1993); ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 720,
para. 5/32-2 (c) (West 1993); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN § 523.090 (Michie 1990); ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 17-A, § 451 (3) (West 1983); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-7-201(5) (1997); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.111-04(3) (1997); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:28-1(d) (West 1995); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 210.25 (McKinney
1988); OR. REV. STAT. § 162.105 (1997); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4902(d) (1983); R.I. GEN. LAWS
§ 11-33-1 (d)(1994); WASH. REV. CODEANN. § 9A.72.060 (West 1988).
113
Section X is a fictitious statute. At present no jurisdictions employ a solely contingent locus
poenitentiae. (Most employ one that is both contingent and dependent on a fixed time period, which
this Article calls a hybrid locus poenitentiae.) This Article later advocates an ideal reformulation of
recantation statutes and employs the contingent locus poenitentiaetype of locuspotentate. See infra
notes 151-53 and accompanying text.
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of inconvenience or prejudice which the witness's false testimony
has caused."'
Despite this commentator's endorsement recantation defenses that employ a purely
contingent locuspoenitentiaeelement are few, if any.
3.

Hybrid Locus Poenitentiae

A hybrid locus poenitentiaehas both a fixed period and a period that is
contingent upon other events. Of all the jurisdictions that advance the recantation
rule, the hybrid locus poenitentiae enjoys the most popularity. This is due, no
doubt, to New York's Ezaugi standard," 5 which the American Law Institute
promulgates in its Model Penal Code:
Retraction. No person shall be convicted of an offense under this
[perjury] Section if he retracted the falsification in the course of
the proceeding in which it was made before it became manifest that
the falsification was or would be exposed and before the
falsification substantially affected the proceeding." 6
Notice there is both a fixed time period in which one must recant and a variable one
that depends upon either the falsification being exposed or a party or the proceeding
being prejudiced. In the majority of recantation defenses, like the Model Penal
Code above, both of these preconditions are required before the opportunity to
recant expires.
Thus, one may retract during the fixed period, but if the other event or
events upon which the locuspoenitentiaeis contingent occurs, the opportunity to
recant is divested. This is so even though the fixed time period, which is "in the
course of the same proceeding" for the Model Penal Code, may not have passed.
Likewise, if the fixed time period expires, one may not successfully recant if the
events upon which the contingency depends have not occurred.

114

Salzman, supra note 4, at 279-280.

115

See People v. Ezaugi, 141 N.E.2d 580, 583 (N.Y. 1957).

116

MODEL PENAL CODE § 240.1 (4) (1962).
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C.

Effect on Party or Proceeding

The next element is the effect a recanter's original lie has on the party or
proceeding. Again, with regard to this element, most jurisdictions follow the Model
Penal Code, which drafted its language based on New York's Recantation defense.
The Model Penal Code provides that a recantation defense is viable if, besides
satisfying all other requisite elements, the retraction
is made "before the
11 7
falsification substantially affected the proceeding." '
Most other jurisdictions that subscribe to the recantation rule require this
element," but some disregard it completely."' Again, like the term "proceeding"
discussed earlier,' it is not entirely clear what "substantially affected the
proceeding" means. Does this mean a burden litigants face from having to hear a
witness testify a second time, this time truthfully? Does this mean irreversible
harm, such as a need for a new trial after a witness died? Or perhaps it means
something simpler like the burden of selecting a new jury? To date, there is little
case law to answer these questions. 21 Even the Model Penal Code leaves no
indication of what these words mean in its comments.12

117

Id.

1

See ALA. CODE§ 13A-10-107 (1995); DEL. CODEANN. tit. 11, § 1231 (1995); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 837.07 (West 1994); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 523.090 (Michies 1990); MONT. CODE ANN. §
45-7-201(5) (1997); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 210.25 (McKinney 1988); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-11-04(3)
(1997); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4902(d) (West 1983); WASH. REV. CoDEANN. § 9A.72.060 (West
1988).
u9
See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-8-508 (West 1986); ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 720,
para.5/32-2 (c) (West 1993); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 451 (3) (West 1983); TEX.PENAL CODE
ANN. § 37.05 (West 1994). See also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:28-1 (d) (West 1995), which provides
similar language: "[W]ithout having caused irreparable harm to any party." Arkansas provides "any
person who in making a retraction causes termination of any official proceeding by reason of prejudice
to a legal right of party to the proceeding shall be guilty of a Class A misdemeanor." ARK. CODE ANN.
§ 5-53-104 (Michie 1997).
120

See supra notes 17-64 and accompanying text.

But see, e.g., United States v. Anfield, 539 F.2d 674 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v.
Slawick,408 F. Supp. 190 (D.C. Del 1975); United States v. Crandall, 363 F. Supp. 648 (W.D. Pa.
1973); United States v. Krogh, 366 F. Supp. 1255 (D.C. Dist. 1973); Annotation, 65 A.L.R. FED. 177,
189-91 (1983).
121

122

See MODEL PENAL CODE § 241.1 cmt. 7 (1980).
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This effect-on-party-or-proceeding element, while not being clearly defined,
has been advocated by commentators, but it has also had its critics.124
V. A CASE FOR THE ADOPTION AND THE
REFORMULATION OF THE RECANTATION DEFENSE
All but the most tyrannical of people believe a judicial proceeding's chief
function is to bring forth truth. Therefore, it is disturbing that the recantation
defense is unavailable in most jurisdictions throughout the United States. It is also
unfortunate that of those states that have adopted recantation defenses, almost all
of them need reformulation. An overhaul of these defenses would cure one of the
two prevailing problems: first,the defense is inept at accomplishing its function of
encouraging recantations; or secondly, it needs improvement to fully maximize its
truth-enticing potential while discouraging lying.
A.

More JurisdictionsShould Adopt a RecantationDefense

Although the recantation doctrine has been slowly gaining acceptance, the
majority of states still remain completed-crime jurisdictions. This gives a
potentially repentant witness no way to redeem himself and avoid the peril of a
perjury conviction and, most important, provides no incentive for the witness to
speak the truth after he has lied.
Completed-crime advocates advance two schools of thought for their
rejection of the recantation doctrine. First, they believe that once the crime is
committed, the "crime is complete"' - that is, the witness has engaged in culpable
behavior for which he must be punished - and this punishment is deserved from the
instant he utters the lie under oath. This proposition pays homage to retributivism,
the view that society should inflict punishment on a wrongdoer because of his moral
culpability. 2 6 Secondly, completed-crime advocates believe a liar's punishment

123

Harris, supra note 3, at 1792.

ALA. CODE § 12A-10-107 commentary (1996) (arguing that the vagueness on what
"substantially affects a proceeding is undesirable").
124

125

United States v. Norris, 300 U.S. 564, 574 (1937).

See generally JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW §2.03 (c) (1987); WAYNE
R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT,JR., CRIMINAL LAW § 1.5 (a) (6) (2d ed. 1986); IMMANUEL KANT, THE
METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE 99-107 (J. Ladd trans., 1965).
126
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serves as both specific and general deterrence to the crime of perjury.127 Because
of this, advocates argue, the completed-crime rule actually decreases perjury by
deterring witnesses from lying when first testifying.
Arguably, the first of these contentions, retributivism, has some merit in
that the act of lying on the witness stand deserves punishment. It is unnecessary,
however, to engage in the age-old debate on the merits of retributivism to see the
unsoundness of the completed-crime rule.
If a liar knows the law will punish him for retracting a previously made lie,
he will surely be hesitant to do so. This is especially true in the absence of proof
that the authorities have discovered or will discover his lie.' Instead, he will most
probably keep his lie a secret. The result of this is terribly ironic: Completed-crime
advocates will fail to accomplish their retributivist goal of punishing the perjurer
because the lie will never likely be discovered in the absence of a recantation
defense.
The second school of thought is that the completed-crime rule's deterrence
value will decrease the incidence of perjury over the recantation rule. In order to
disprove this theory, it is necessary to discuss some basic criminology. Based on
empirical studies, criminologists universally agree that the two strongest factors in
deterring crime are, first, the severity of the penalty and, secondly, the crime's risk
of apprehension and conviction.'29 The latter of the two criteria has proven most
effective for deterring crime, but ironically it is the most difficult to implement. 30
Applying these two factors to the recantation rule, it is apparent that the
recantation defense does not decrease deterrence, as completed-crime advocates
claim. This is because a well-formulated recantation defense"' is available to liars
only when there is little, if any, prospect of discovering the lie and therefore almost
no chance of obtaining a conviction. As for a penalty, jurisdictions vary on

For information on specific and general deterrence see generally SANFORD H. KADISH &
STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESsES: CASES AND MATERIALS 115 (6th ed.
1995).
127

128
See infra notes 138-50 and accompanying text where this Article discusses this factor in
greater detail, in addition to advocating that motive for recanting be the most important element of a
recantation defense.

129

See FRANKLIN ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, DETERRENCE: THE LEGAL THREAT IN CRIME

CONTROL 158-72 (1973).
130

See generally KADDISH &

131

See supra notes 128-53 and accompanying text.

SCHULHOFER,

supra note 127, at 101-3 1.
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punishment, but most are fairly harsh.' Because, as most criminologists believe,
the risk of being caught and convicted is the most important criterion to indicate
whether one will commit a crime, the deterrence value of the completed-crime rule
remains doubtful at best.
While the arguments for the completed-crime rule are precarious, the
recantation rule's sound public policy of bringing forth the truth demands its
adoption by all jurisdictions. Even if, for argument's sake, completed-crime
proponents' goals of retributivism and deterrence are obtainable in a completedcrime jurisdiction, public policy demands that courts take every measure to bring
forth the truth. This is true even at the expense of letting a liar get away with
perjury. Although such a witness deserves punishment for his initial lie, this
punishment should not be at the expense of litigants whose stake in a trial is often
great.'
Bringing out the truth is even more crucial in a criminal trial where life
and liberty are on the line.
This balancing of public-policy interests is known in philosophy as
utilitarianism.'34 Put simply, utilitarianism means that ends must justify the means;
or, stated differently, one may do a "wrong" if its ultimate effect is "good" or best
for society. Applying this to the recantation rule, we except the "wrong" of letting
a witness's lies go unpunished if his later recantation provides the better effect of
producing something "good," which is speaking the truth to the court.
Today, utilitarianism is manifest in much of our jurisprudence.'35 Indeed,
much of the policy and reason behind an array of today's legislation is strictly
utilitarian. Interestingly, some states have employed utilitarianism in such a way
that has resulted in a slightly different recantation defense.
Some states only allow a recantation defense to a witness in a felony or
other high-level case and not to a low-level trial.'36 Perhaps the reasoning for this
132

See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.423 (West 1996) (providing a felony punishment

not more than fifteen years in state prison).
133

Cf Bussey v. State, 64 S.W. 268, 269 (Ark. 1901).

134

Classical utilitarianism was formulated over two centuries ago by Jeremy Bentham. See

JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCrIONTO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION (1789). See

generally DRESSLER, supra note 126, § 2.03.
135

See, e.g., H.L. POHLMAN, JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES & UTILITARIAN JURISPRUDENCE

(1984).
a
See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-8-508 (West 1996) (retraction defense available only
against charges of perjury in the first degree); DEL. CoDEANN. tit 11, § 1231 (1995) (retraction defense
available only for perjury, not for misdemeanor of making a false written statement); TEx. PENAL CODE
ANN. § 37.05 (West 1994) (retraction defense only available for felony of aggravated perjury, not for
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is the belief that excusing the "wrong" of perjury can only benefit society if a
greater "good" is accomplished; that "good" being a fair trial of a felony or other
high-level crime based on truth.
Thus, applied to a basic utilitarian balance, these states presumably reason
that it is more important to punish a liar for perjury than it is to improve the chances
of the truth coming to light in an insignificant low-level trial, such as for a speeding
violation. Because perjury is a greater offense than, for instance, speeding, society
should punish the perjurer without giving him a recantation defense, which would
ultimately aid the defendant or prosecution in a speeding violation hearing. This
also includes other low-level trials where crimes or issues less serious than perjury
are being litigated. Some jurisdictions presumably reason that this gives the
greatest benefit to society by punishing a greater crime.
Although the intent of making a distinction between high-level trials and
low-level ones is noble, the logic is ultimately flawed for the same reason that the
goal of retributivism is impossible in a completed-crime jurisdiction.37 Witnesses
in these low-level trials will simply not recant their testimony when the lie has not
been or will not be discovered. Hence, the goal of punishing a greater crime at the
expense of a lessor one will not occur, as lying witnesses will remain unrepentant
for fear of prosecution.
B.

The Ideal RecantationDefense

A well-formulated recantation defense increases the likelihood of veracity
and, contrary to what critics believe, has no risk of encouraging dishonesty. But a
poorly formulated defense, as some courts and commentators rightfully fear, will
indeed encourage lying.' Likewise, a narrowly applied recantation defense, while
not fostering untruthfulness, will lose the benefits of encouraging truthful witnesses.
1.

Eliminate Ambiguity in the Language of Most Defenses

The first step to formulating a model recantation statute is to eliminate
ambiguity. Like New York's retraction statute,139 discussed earlier, 4 ' most
misdemeanor of simple perjury).
137

See supra note 126 and accompanying text.

138

See United States v. Denison, 663 F.2d 611 (5th Cir. 1981).

139

N.Y. PENAL LAW § 210.25 (McKinney 1988).

140

See supra notes 54-57 and accompanying text.
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recantation defenses on the books today are adulterated with a lack of specificity in
the language of their terms. As a result, a witness considering retracting a
previously made lie is bedeviled by the question, "Is a defense available to me?"
With the recantation defense, as with all criminal statutes, ambiguity should be
avoided like the plague. Penal consequences are too great to be left to the
capricious nature of ajudge's interpretation of legislatures' written memorial - the
statute. Therefore, legislatures must expressly define all terms in their recantation
statutes. In the absence of unequivocal language, a potentially repentant witness
will be hesitant to recant because he lacks knowledge of his fate for doing so. 4 '
Some judicial-activist proponents might argue that these ambiguities can
be left to the courts to decipher. Unfortunately, however, because a witness will
hesitate to admit he lied if he is unclear of the recantation defense's availability, he
will likely elect not to recant. This disincentive to truth telling has resulted and will
result in a barrier to case-law development to correct this ambiguity. Empirical
evidence of this judicial inertia can be seen in New York, where no published case
has commented on the vague terms of New York's retraction statute in the thirty
years that the statute has been in existence. Presumably, potential recanters in New
York do not know whether their recantation was in the same "proceeding" or
whether it harmed the party or proceeding, both of which are necessary to invoke
the retraction defense in New York.'42 In summary, case law defining vague
recantation statutes will be extremely slow to develop as potential recanters will be
hesitant to use the defense and take their chances in the appeals process. Therefore,
it is imperative that lawmakers overhaul today's recantation statutes to define all
terms within the language of their respective recantation defenses.

The retraction provision of the federal perjury statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1623(d) (1994), has
received criticism because of the doubt over whether it or 18 U.S.C. § 1621 (1994), another perjury
statute that disallows the retraction defense, is applicable. Although both are perjury statutes, only the
former contains a recantation defense in sub-part (d). Thus, if unsure which statute is applicable to
them, witnesses will likely choose not to recant. For a detailed discussion of this see George W.
Aycock, III, Note, Nothing But the Truth: A Solution to the Current Inadequacies of the Federal
PerjuryStatutes, 28 VAL. U. L. REV. 247 (1993). See generally Harris, supra note 3, at 1792; 65 AM.
JUR. 2D Perjury § 107 (1988); SUSAN W. BRENNER & GREGORY G. LOCKHART, FEDERAL GRAND JURY
141

PRACTICE

§13.17

(1993); THE GRAND JURY PROJECT INC. OF THE NATIONAL LAWYERS GUILD,

REPRESENTATION OF WITNESSES BEFORE FEDERAL GRAND JURIES
supra note 4, at 280-86.

§ 15.3 (d) (3d ed. 1993); Salzman,

The ambiguity ofNew York's recantation defense was discussed in detail earlier above. See
supranotes 58-64 and accompanying text.
142

143
As mentioned earlier, some state statues have defined important terms within their statutes,
and this is indeed wise. See supra note 107. More jurisdictions should do so as well.
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2.

Motive or Mens Rea Element is Paramount

The single most important element for an effective recantation defense is
motive. Disregarding motive, as some recantation defense statutes do, is terribly
foolish as it will likely encourage perjury. Witnesses will lie freely, and later if it
becomes manifest that their lie has or will be discovered, recant their testimony. As
a result, this Article advocates the objective-view-of-motive standard,1" which
affords a defense to a liar only if the authorities have not discovered or will not
discover the lie.
In applying this motive standard, there should be no leniency. This means
any indication that the lie has been or will be discovered, however slight, should
preclude a defense to the liar. If the motive standard is viewed strictly, as this
Article suggests, there is no chance that the availability of a recantation defense will
encourage perjury, as some courts and commentators fear. However, any lesser
standard of motive very well might encourage perjury.
One may suggest that a recantation defense should employ the good-faith
motive requirement, which allows a defense to a liar who recants before he, himself,
believes that the lie has been or will be discovered. The good-faith exception is an
unwise choice for two reasons. First, it is a difficult task for any court or jury to
determine one's subjective mind. Secondly, and most important, the lie is culpable
conduct that deserves punishment. The only reason for excusing the lie in the first
place is utilitarianism;'45 that is, offering the defense contributes to the greater
public policy of fostering truthfulness in judicial proceedings. In the absence of any
possible benefit for doing so, the lie should be punished. For instance, if the
authorities know of the lie, but the liar himself believes his lie will remain secret for
eternity, the court has discovered the lie and the truth will come to light,despite any
recantation. Because of this, there is no benefit for pardoning the liar from perjury,
which is a culpable act. In the absence of any benefit, the lie must be punished. As
the Supreme Court stated in UnitedStates v. Norris, the lie is culpable behavior
from the instant it is uttered.'46 Thus, the objective-view-of-motive standard more
appropriately obtains the optimal benefit of fostering truthfulness while not
needlessly excusing perjurers whose recantations fail to offer the court the greater
benefit of veracity; after all, such information has or will become known without
a later-repentant liar's recantation.
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See supranotes 80-86, where the objective-view-on-motive element is discussed in detail.
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See supra notes 134-35 and accompanying text.
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Judge Desmond, in his dissenting opinion in Ezaugi, reasoned that "since
the recantation rule's purpose is not to reward or punish the liar but to get the truth
into the record, the perjurer's motive for recanting has nothing to do with it at
all."' 47 This argument overlooks the law's obligation to punish perjurers when there
is no benefit for pardoning the crime. Moreover, if the liar is to be found out,
presumably the truth will come to light anyway. Thus, contrary to Judge
Desmond's dissent, the "interest ofjustice"'4 8 will be served equally if the perjurer
is punished because courts still "get the truth into the record."' 49
Lastly, perhaps in the spirit of utilitarianism, some suggest that the
recantation defense be available to witnesses who recant - even with an impure
motive - if once the lie is discovered, additional corrected testimony comes out that
would never have been discovered and benefits the overall proceeding. 50
Logically, this is a sound and well-reasoned proposition, but in practice it may
encourage perjury.
3.

Eliminate All Other Requirements

As long as the objective-view-of-motive standard requirement is strictly
construed, as suggested above,' legislatures should eliminate all other elements.
It is irrelevant when a liar ultimately recants his misstatements. Therefore, to
impose an arbitrary locus poenitentiaeor time period is without purpose. If without
a recantation the truth will never come to light, then it is unimportant how long the
liar waited until he recanted. This is true even if it is after the conclusion of the
proceeding or trial.'52 What is only important is that but for the liar's recantation
the truth will never have come to light. An arbitrary, finite locus poenitentiae
neither discourages perjury nor increases recantations. After the time period has
147

People v. Ezaugi, 141 N.E.2d 580, 584 (N.Y. 1957) (Desmond, J.,
dissenting).
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United States v. Del Toro, 513 F.2d 656 (2d Cir. 1975); Salzman, supra note 4, at 280.
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See supra notes 144-50 and accompanying text.

Recantation of perjured testimony produces a complex set of issues in both criminal and civil
how or whether to go about a retrial. In the interest of brevity, this Article does not
involving
trials
touch upon them. For more information, see generally Janice J. Repka, Comment, Rethinking the
Standardfor New TrialMotions Based upon RecantationsofNewly DiscoveredEvidence, 134 U. PA.
L. REv. 1433 (1986); Sharon Cobb, Comment, Gary Dotson as Victim: The Legal Response to
Recanting Testimony, 35 EMORY L.J. 969 (1986).
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elapsed, perjurers will keep their lies secret. This fails to furtherjustice. Therefore,
the only sensible locus poenitentiae is one that is contingent upon motive only,
which this Article has called a contingentlocus poenitentiae.
The same is true with the effect-on-party-or-proceeding element. No matter
how irreparably harmed the court or its litigants are, it is senseless to disallow the
recantation defense. If the effect-on-party-or-proceeding element is employed in a
recantation defense, witnesses will elect not to recant once it is apparent that a party
or the proceeding has been harmed. Presumably any recantation of false testimony
offers some benefit, however slight, to the parties and proceeding. After all, if a
party or proceeding has been harmed, a recantation can do nothing but alleviate
some, if not all, of the harm. With the effect-on-party-or-proceeding element
included in defenses, witnesses will refrain from recanting once the lie harms the
party or proceeding, and there will be no chance, however slight, of reducing that
harm caused by speaking the truth. Thus, this element, along with all others except
for the objective-view-of-motive element, should be discarded.
Keeping the foregoing in mind, this Article advocates the following
recantation statute, which embodies all of the suggestions outlined in this Article:
§ Y Recantation. It shall be a defense to perjury if one who
knowingly lies under oath retracts his falsification before it
becomes manifest that the falsification was or would be exposed
to the authorities.
Disregarding the effect-on-party-or-proceeding and locus poenitentiae
elements is perhaps the most controversial proposition of this Article. The few
commentators who discuss the recantation defense disagree with this Article's
argument for their elimination. Instead, they argue the contrary - that these two
elements are indeed necessary. However, closer reading of their writings reveals
their arguments are conclusory. They fail to explain why these two elements are in
fact necessary.'53
15
Harris, supra note 3, at 1792. See also Salzman, supra note 4, at 280. Mr. Salzman,
contrary to the previously mentioned commentator, Ms. Harris, offers at least some support for the
effect-on-party-or-proceeding and locus poenitentiaeelements as articulated in People v. Ezaugi, 141
N.E.2d 580 (N.Y. 1957). Nevertheless, as this Article has illustrated, his arguments for effect-onparty-or-proceeding and locus poenitentiaeelements lack merit. Mr. Salzman writes:
While some state and federal courts have frustrated the development of a workable
recantation rule through misplaced emphasis on chronological timeliness [which
this Article calls a fixed locus Poenitentiae],the "New York rule" [see supranote
75 and accompanying text] advanced in Ezaugi recognized the proper
interweaving of the factors of timeliness, motive, and prejudice as a better solution
to the perjury problem. The Ezaugi test requires that the presiding judge inquire

initially into the "timeliness" of a correction; however, the question of timeliness
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IV. CONCLUSION

In order to maximize the truth-gathering function of judicial proceedings,
more legislatures should adopt properly formulated recantation defenses. However,
in adopting them, legislatures must use unequivocal language and formulate them
in with an objective-view-of-motive, which considers the recanter's motive for
retracting to be paramount in deciding whether to award a recantation defense, as
this Article suggests. While motive is important, all other elements presently
employed by most states' defenses should be discarded. Such a formulation will

yield the following benefits: it will increase recantations of lies; discourage perjury;
and, ultimately, it will best serve public policy by pardoning perjurers only when
the greater good results from doing so.

turns on whether the testimony sought to be corrected has already prejudiced the
administration of justice and on whether the witness believed he was providing
information with his correction which the authorities did not already have. By
varying the intensity of this scrutiny, a deciding court can encourage corrections
whenever it deems correction helpful without making the privilege available to
every potential perjurer.
Salzman, supra note 4, at 280 (citation omitted). Additionally, Mr. Salzman advocates - in a more
conclusory manner - that recantation defenses should incorporate the effect-on-party-or-proceeding
element: "Extreme cases, such as a correction offered subsequent to the completion of a trial, surely
cannot be permitted. Thus, even under the most liberal view of 'immediately,' there must be some
point after which a correction will always be too late." Id. at 279 n.54. Notice that Mr. Salzman fails
to give any reason for such a time limitation.
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